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The power to immediately punish an offender for a direct contempt is accepted
as an inherent power of the courts. It arises from the courts' necessity of preventing
obstruction to their due administration of justice.1 3 On the other hand, such power
is necessarily of an arbitrary
nature, and should therefore be used with great
14
prudence and caution.
In the instant case, as we have seen, none of the essential elements constituting
the contempt, viz., the reasons for the absence, were within the immediate view
and presence of the court. Furthermore, where the court is not in full knowledge of
all the essential elements constituting the contempt, it must give the accused notice
and a hearing so that he may reasonably have the opportunity of presenting all the
facts to the court before the latter renders judgment. To deny him this opportunity,
as was done in the instant case by summarily finding the accused in contempt, is to
deny to him his constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
-Joseph H. Radensky.

CRIMINAL LAW: ARSON-STRICT APPLICATION OF THE FELONY-MURDER
DOCTRINE.-By common law, and in many states by statute,' homicide committed in
the perpetration of at least the more dangerous felonies is murder. The case law on
the subject broadly states that criminal responsibility for homicide committed during
the perpetration of one of the enumerated felonies extends not only to the person
doing the killing, but also to all his accomplices in the underlying felony.2 In spite
of this oft-quoted statement of the rule, certain limitations of the principle have been
recognized. In the first place, it appears to be settled that the homicide and felony
must not be associated merely in point of time, but they must be integrated and
related in a causal way. 3 Secondly, in the case of a conspiracy, the act of one conspirator must be in furtherance of the conspiracy. 4 The Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Bolish5 rejected a possible third exception, to wit, the accidental killing of
an accomplice by his own hand.
The defendant, for the purpose of collecting insurance, induced one Robert Flynn
to set fire to the insured building. While perpetrating the arson Flynn was badly
burned and died 19 hours later as a result thereof. The court felt it immaterial that
defendant's presence at the scene was not established. Defendant was indicted for
murder and was convicted of murder in the first degree. Although a new trial was
granted on other grounds, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the felonymurder rule. The main contention of the defendant was that the felony-murder
doctrine could not be applied where the deceased was the substantial or proximate
cause of his own death. By what appears to be begging the question the court
answered the defendant thusly:
"... Yet this court has uniformly held that an accidental killing in the perpetration
'8 In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) ; The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL.
L. REV. 959 (1931) ; see also CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PRoc. §§ 128, 1209.
" 43 Cal.2d at 762, 278 P.2d at 685.

1 Some typical statutes are: CONN. GEN. STATUTES § 6043; IND. STATS. ANN. § 10-3401; IowA
CODE § 12,911; CALIF. PENAL CODE § 189.
'People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. 125 (1889) ; People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac.
928 (1915).
' State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932).
'People v. Faught, 343 Ill.
312, 175 N.E. 446 (1931) ; People v. Basile, 356 Ill.
171, 190 N.E.
307 (1934) ; People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 139 N.E. 558 (1923).
' 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
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of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery or burglary or any other of the enumerated felonies
is murder in the first degree. The reason is that any person committing or attempting to
commit any of these major felonies is motivated by malice and when the killing of a
human being directly results, even though not intended, from his malicious act, it is murder
because malice, the essential element of murder, is present. The felon's malicious 'act in
perpetrating or attempting to perpretrate, his planned 6major crime is justly regarded by
the law, as the causative antecedent of the homicide."
However, in less legalistic terms, -thecourt later rationalized its answer on the ground

of foreseeability. The facts would seem to substantiate such a theory.
It is foreseeable that people are dwelling within a building. It is also possible
to foresee others attempting to extinguish the fire and to save lives and property.
No one would argue that the death of any of the above-mentioned persons came from
a superseding cause. Based on this reasoning, it is also foreseeable that one who is
induced to-commit the act will himself be killed while setting fire to the building.
There is a scarcity of authority on, the precise question with apparently only two
other cases in point. The first case was a California case, People v. Ferlin.7 There,
as in the principal case, the defendant and another set fire to a building for the
purpose of collecting insurance. The defendant's co-conspirator was accidentally
burned to death. On the original hearing s the California Supreme Court held that
the defendant was properly convicted of murder in the first degree committed during
the perpetration of arson. But, on rehearing,9 the court reversed and decided that
the perpetrator of a felony is not guilty of murder because of the accidental death
of his co-conspirator who caused his own death. Although the applicable California
statute' 0 is identical with the Pennsylvania statute 1 the reasoning of the California
court differed greatly from that of the case under discussion. Whereas the court in
the Bolisl case based its decision on the question of foreseeability, this was ignored
in the Ferlin case. Illustrative of the California approach is this:
"It cannot he said from the record in the instant case that defendant and deceased
Such an event was
had a common design that deceased should accidentally kill himself.
'
not in furtherance of the conspiracy, but entirely opposed to it."12

The truth of this statement is not doubted. But is it an answer to the question?
True, the accidental killing of the co-conspirator was not in furtherance of the plan
to commit arson. But this does not inevitably mean that the deceased's act was a
superseding cause that would relieve the defendant of liability.
Another statement by the majority would appear to be even less informative:
"If the defendant herein is guilty of murder because of the accidental killing, of his
co-conspirator then it must follow that Skala (deceased) was also guilty of murder, and
from his buras that he would have been guilty of an attempt to
if he had recovered
58

commit murder"'

At best, this decision can be said to be based on something less than the application
of legal principles.
I1d. at 513, 113 A.2d at 474.
'203 Cal.587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928).
8257 Pac. 857.
See note 7 supra.
"All murder ... which is committed in the perpetration of,
10 CALIF. PENAL CODE § 189:
or attempt to perpetrate arson ... is murder of the 1st degree. .. "
"'Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872 § 701; PunnoN's PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1945).
12 See note 7 supra at 597, 265 Pac. at 235.
"Id. at 596, 265 Pac. at 234.
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The New York case of People v. La Barbera4 also involved similar facts and
there it was held, as in the California decision, that the felony-murder doctrine did
not apply to a conspirator causing his own death. But rather than face the problem
squarely the court sought to justify its decision on an interpretation of murder. Under
the New York statute murder is a criminal homicide. 15 Under another statute homicide is defined as "the killing of one human being by act, procurement, or omission
of another."'16 The court concluded that in view of the fact that deceased killed himself, he did not commit homicide as defined by the statute, and therefore, if he did
not commit homicide, his associates could not be held for homicide. The case affords
no help in solving the problem based as it is on statutory interpretation. It is
submitted, however, that the facts still come within the statute. Deceased was a human
being; he was killed, and the requisite "act .. .of another" can be considered to be
the inducement by his (deceased's) associates to commit the crime of arson.
The common law definition of murder is the killing of one human being by
another with malice aforethought or without legal justification or excuse, under circumstances insufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter. 17 Malice aforethought
was the essential ingredient. But the ordinary meaning of malice aforethought was
not always the same as its legal sense. Express or actual malice aforethought existed
when a homicide was intentionally committed without excuse, justification, or provocation. But there was also "implied malice aforethought" which was applied not merely
to cases in which the existence of the intent to kill could be inferred from the nature
of defendant's conduct, but also applied to cases where the homicide was unintentional but committed during the perpretration of some collateral felony.' 8 From
this latter extension emerged the felony-murder doctrine. The theory behind the
doctrine was that murder required only a killing based on malice; a common law
felony contained malice; the transposition of intent from the felony to the homicide
made the killing murder.
It is apparent that the common law theory was more a deterrent than a logical
extension of the implied malice rule. Looked upon as a deterrent the rule is desirable.
Why then did the California court set forth a limitation? No valid reason was given
as to why the felon is not responsible when his partner in crime is killed, yet subject
to the death penalty when the victim is an innocent party.
It is not improbable that not all of this criticism is warranted. As stated before,
the common law application of the rule was a strict and inflexible one. Perhaps the
Ferlin decision is an expression on the part of the California court to set down what
it believes to be a proper limitation to the rule. For the sake of legal principles let
us hope this was the court's intention.
One may quarrel with the result of the Pennsylvania holding but it is to be commended for one thing. The court was confronted with a unique factual situation.
Rather than arbitrarily rule one way or the other, as many courts are prone to do, the
court applied to the facts solid legal principles in reaching their conclusion.
-- George R. Moscone.

159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y. Supp. 257 (1936).
"N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044.
16 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1042.
"Com. v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 304 (1850).
"Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York (1937), 6 FORDHAm L. REV. 45.
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